Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical Style by Spiegler, R
Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical
Style
Ran Spieglery
August 6, 2018
Abstract
Behavioral Economics is widely perceived to be part of the profes-
sions shift away from a culture that places abstract theory at its cen-
ter. I present a critical discussion of the atheoretical style with which
behavioralthemes are often disseminated: a purely anecdotal style
in popular expositions, simplistic cost-benet modeling in pieces that
target a wide audience of academic economists, and the practice of
capturing psychological forces by distorting familiar functional forms.
I argue that the subject of psychology and economicsis intrinsically
foundational, and that a heavier dose of abstract theorizing is essential
for it to realize its transformative potential.
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1 Introduction
In his scientic autobiography Misbehaving, Richard Thaler suggests a
link between his anomaliesproject and Thomas Kuhns theory of scientic
revolutions. Looking back to the 1980s, when his list of anomalies started to
appear in print, he remarks:
An important aspect of Thomas Kuhns model of scientic revo-
lutions...is that paradigms change only once experts believe there
are a large number of anomalies that are not explained by the
current paradigm...As someone who had until recently still been
in the promising stage of his career, it would be viewed as
brash, unseemly, and self-destructive to talk about my own work
as something that could be part of a revolution. My goal was
much more modest: just get a few more papers published and
begin to establish the case that adding some psychology to eco-
nomics was an activity worth pursuing. But I had certainly read
Kuhns path-breaking book The Structure of Scientic Revolu-
tions, and had secretly spent idle moments wondering whether
anything like a paradigm shift could ever be possible in eco-
nomics.(Thaler (2015), p. 169)
Thus, in the early days of Behavioral Economics, it made sense to think (or
at least daydream) about it as a movement toward a revolutionary paradigm
shift, a notion that implies an overhaul of fundamental economic theory.
Times have changed. In a recent piece about teaching Behavioral Eco-
nomics to undergraduates, Laibson and List (2015) dene the subject as
follows:
Behavioral economics uses variants of traditional economic as-
sumptions (often with a psychological motivation) to explain and
predict behavior, and to provide policy prescriptions.
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No Kuhnian paradigm shift here. Laibson and Lists denition is method-
ologically conservative; it emphasizes the reliance of Behavioral Economics
on the existing modeling frameworks of economic theory, and does not count
the search for new ones as part of its mission. Thaler himself says in an
American Economic Association Presidential Address (Thaler (2016)) that
the rise of Behavioral Economics is sometimes characterized as a kind of
paradigmshifting revolution within economics, but I think that is a misread-
ing of the history of economic thought.He goes on to describe Behavioral
Economics as simply one part of the growing importance of empirical work
in economics. Despite an occasional nod to theory, his vision is quite re-
strictive: Behavioral theories will be more like engineering, a set of practical
enhancements that lead to better predictions about behavior.
Thus, Thaler associates the growing inuence of Behavioral Economics
with the professions move away from a theory-centric culture. This concep-
tion of Behavioral Economics as an empirical antidote, rather than a cata-
lyst to abstract theorizing is quite familiar. However, it is not self-evident.
Compare it with an earlier transformation of the culture of economics(to
borrow a phrase from Rubinstein (2006)), brought about by Game Theory.
Both Behavioral Economics and Game Theory were liberating forces: Game
Theory removed the shackles that had tied economists to competitive mar-
kets, and Behavioral Economics freed them from prior xations on narrow
self-interest and error-free decision makers. The di¤erence is that unlike Be-
havioral Economics, Game Theory not only liberated economists, but also
demanded of them to learn a new language. Ideas like Nash equilibrium and
its renements, implementation or robustness to high-order beliefs are not
variants on traditional assumptions, but a web of new concepts, model-
ing tools and techniques. Behavioral Economics demands relatively little in
this regard, as many of its modeling ideas are reinterpretations or formerly
unutilized specications of standard frameworks. This di¤erence is not an
intrinsic feature of the two subjects, but a historical development. Had exper-
iments been more fundamental for the early days of Game Theory, we might
have seen a more empirical, less mathematically oriented subject. Likewise,
the project of psychologizingeconomic theory could be carried out with a
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greater role for abstract, foundational theory. If anything, this project strikes
me as intrinsically more foundational than the study of strategic interactions.
At the end of his Presidential Address, Richard Thaler states: If eco-
nomics does develop along these lines, the term behavioral economicswill
eventually disappear from our lexicon. All economics will be as behavioral as
the topic requires...This paper is about the atheoretical style in which this
process is taking place. I do not focus on the development of Behavioral Eco-
nomics itself as much as on how it is incorporated into the broader discourse
of economics. In this context, the atheoretical style of a given piece can
take various forms, depending on the pieces genre and intended audience.
Popular expositions of behavioralthemes tend to be purely anecdotal and
devoid of theoretical reasoning, even by Popular Science standards. Pieces
that target a general audience of academic economists make use of the most
basic modeling devices in our toolkit, even when the subject matter demands
(and the audience can digest) a more sophisticated approach. Incorporating
behavioralelements into economic models in regular journal articles tends
to follow an appliedstyle that takes specic functional forms - rather than
the modeling frameworks they belong to - as the starting point for the analy-
sis.
Of course, there are abstract approaches to psychology and economics
out there - sometimes by card-carrying behavioral economists, and often by
theorists outside this circle. Rubinstein (1998) formulates decision processes
in a clear pure theory style. Recent work in the wake of Gul and Pe-
sendorfers (2001) model of self-control preferences extends the tradition of
axiomatic decision theory to new domains of choice objects, in an attempt to
incorporate new psychological elements. But are these developments part of
Behavioral Economics? I dont think that Gul, Pesendorfer or Rubinstein are
viewed by anyone (themselves included) as behavioral economists. Indeed,
they have written critiques of the style of Behavioral Economics (Rubinstein
(2006), Gul and Pesendorfer (2008)). Their approaches seldom feature in
Behavioral Economics conference programs or course syllabi. Thus, when
we speak of the inuence of Behavioral Economics on the psychologizing
of mainstream economics, it seems sensible to disregard these alternative
4
approaches.
However, the key question is not whether the growing inuence of Behav-
ioral Economics has an atheoretical avor, but whether this has any costs.
I will argue that it does. Given that Behavioral Economics deals with the
very building blocks of economic behavior, it has an intrinsic foundational
character. Playing it down leads to a atter discourse that robs psychol-
ogy and economicsof the conceptual depth and richness that the subject
deserves. And at times it can stand in the way of obtaining substantive
economic insights.
Full critical examination of the coevolution of Behavioral Economics and
the general atheoretical trend in economics is a fascinating topic for histori-
ans and sociologists of economic thought; it would require a full-length book
and lies beyond the scope of a paper like this. The best I can do is illus-
trate my thesis with prominent recent examples of how behavioralthemes
are absorbed in the wider discourse of economics. Given my emphasis on
the dissemination of Behavioral Economics (rather than its production), I
will mostly consider eminent authors who are not recognized as full time
behavioral economists.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I use George Ak-
erlof and Robert Shillers 2015 book Phishing for Phools to discuss the
anecdotal, theory-free style that is common in popular expositions of Be-
havioral Economics. In Section 3, I use John Campbells 2016 Ely Lecture
to demonstrate the limitations of a simplistic cost-benet style of modeling
in expositions of behavioralthemes that target a general audience of aca-
demic economists. In Section 4, I turn to the functional-form style that
often characterizes Behavioral Economics papers, taking as my main point of
reference a recent methodological essay by Rabin (2013) that promotes this
style. Thus, as the paper progresses, the genres that I examine become more
technical and the targeted audiences become more narrowly professional.
In the concluding section, I come back full circle and return to Thalers
opening quote. I argue that the atheoretical style e¤ectively denies the sub-
jects paradigm-shifting potential that Thaler secretly dreamed of in the
1980s. It makes the subject seem more harmless than it truly is. For Behav-
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ioral Economics to fully realize this potential, it has to put a higher premium
on abstract theorizing in general, and on the creation of new modeling frame-
works in particular.
Given that this paper will contain a lot of talk about targeting audiences,
Id better describe my own target audience. The readers I am keen to ad-
dress are economists who are interested in pure or applied theory as well as
in Behavioral Economics, either as practitioners or as curious observers. My
impression is that many of them, especially young ones, have grown with
the psychological realism vs. theoretical abstractionnarrative and learned
to take it for granted. I hope to convince them that this separation is nei-
ther necessary nor desirable. Interest in psychology and economicsand a
taste for theoretical abstraction can and should coexist, rather than being
conceived of as antagonistic alternatives.
2 The Anecdotal Style
The most extreme manifestation of the atheoretical style is expositions of
behavioral themes that shed theoretical reasoning altogether, in favor of
a loose collection of anecdotes about the economic consequences of decision
biases and non-standard motivations. Naturally, this style is most likely to
be seen in pieces that address a broad audience.
In this section I examine a recent example of this genre: Robert Ak-
erlof and Robert Shillers Phishing for Phools(Akerlof and Shiller (2015)).
Their book explores the implications of consumer fallibility for the way we
ought to think about the free market. Its main thesis is that consumersde-
parture from rationality (their phoolishness, to use the authorsneologism)
makes the proliferation of exploitative transactions (phishing) an inevitable
feature of the market system. Akerlof and Shiller make their case with a col-
lection of anecdotes about market exploitation of fallible consumers; their
exposition is almost entirely devoid of theoretical reasoning. As one might
expect from these authors, the anecdotes are illuminating and woven into an
absorbing story. Nevertheless, in this section I argue that the anecdotal style
has its limitations, and that incorporating some theorizing would have been
6
valuable.
In the context of a popular book, I perceive the term theorizingin very
broad terms. In particular, I do not identify theorizing with formal model-
ing, and allow for verbal abstractions that do not have a formal model in the
background. Even those are very rare in Phishing for Phools. At any rate,
the specic theoretical ideas that I will invoke in this section (and are missing
from the book) are all borrowed from the existing theoretical literature on
markets with behavioralconsumers. Following the norm in academic eco-
nomics, these theoretical ideas were originally presented as formal models,
with varying degrees of abstraction and sophistication. Incorporating these
ideas into Phishing for Phools would have meant popularizing these models.
And here I must get a natural objection o¤ the table, and that is the
argument that a popular book has no room for theoretical arguments that
are derived from formal models. I strongly disagree. The fact that many
popular books on Behavioral Economics were written by psychologists and
marketing researchers accounts for their collection of biasesstyle. But it
does not follow that the anecdotal style must carry over to discussion of the
biaseseconomic implications. By analogy, no popular exposition of Game
Theory is complete without some description of Nash equilibrium, backward
induction or signaling arguments. Of course, the expositions are verbal and
entertaining, but they go beyond mere anecdotes. In an age when authors
like Brian Cox and Simon Singh are writing best-selling books that contain
a sketch of the derivation of E = mc2 or an explanation of RSA encryption,
readers of popular economics can survive a bit of non-technical theorizing.
Linking isolated anecdotes
One of the earliest stories in Phishing for Phools involves the famous empiri-
cal nding of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) that health-club customers
appear to overestimate their future consumption when choosing a price plan.
Many of those who select monthly subscriptions (with automatic renewal)
end up paying more than if they had opted for a bythe-visit plan - they
pay not to go to the gym, as DellaVigna and Malmendier put it in the title
of their paper.
Remarkably, except for two sentences at the end of the book, Akerlof and
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Shiller remain silent about a simple theoretical argument that DellaVigna
and Malmendier themselves make in a companion paper (DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004)). In their model, two rms play a simultaneous-move
game in which they simultaneously o¤er two-part tari¤s to consumers with a
taste for immediate gratication. In the health-club context, this means that
ex-ante, consumers would like to commit to do plenty of physical exercise in
the future, but as time goes by their preferences change and they become
lazier. Whether or not consumers can predict this future change in their
preferences, the two-part tari¤s that emerge in Nash equilibrium consist of
a large lump-sum payment and a per-unit price below marginal cost. By
comparison, if consumers had dynamically consistent preferences, rms would
adopt marginal-cost pricing in Nash equilibrium.
Why is the omission of this theoretical result remarkable? Because in
a later chapter, Akerlof and Shiller present yet another example of market
exploitation: the pricing of credit cards (see pp. 68-69). Here, common
price plans are a mirror image of the health-club case; they involve no (or
e¤ectively negative) lump sum and a high marginal interest rate. DellaVigna
and Malmendiers model o¤ers a simple explanation. Credit cards enable the
consumer to enjoy an immediate consumption benet and defer its cost.
In contrast, attending a health club is an investment that pays o¤ in the
future. According to the DellaVigna-Malmendier model, this inversion in
the temporal distribution of costs and benets explains the direction of the
equilibrium departure from marginal-cost pricing.
The logic behind this result depends on whether the consumer predicts
the future change in his preferences. When he does, he seeks a commitment
device to counter his taste for immediate gratication. A high marginal inter-
est rate acts is a partial commitment device that deters excessive use of the
credit card, whereas a low per-visit price acts e¤ectively as a partial commit-
ment device that incentivizes health-club attendance. When the consumer
underestimates his future taste for immediate gratication, the equilibrium
two-part tari¤ is an e¤ective bet on the consumers future consumption. The
rm and the consumer have di¤erent prior beliefs regarding the consumers
future preferences, and therefore they have a motive to engage in speculative
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trade, shifting net consumer utility from the state predicted by the rm to
the state predicted by the consumer.
The DellaVigna-Malmendier model thus links two, otherwise distinct ex-
amples of exploitative pricing. The model not only links them, but also ex-
plains the di¤erence in their departures from marginal cost pricing. Luckily
for authors of a popular book, this involves an undergraduate-level argument
that can easily be conveyed to a broad audience. At the same time, it is preg-
nant with follow-up questions that feed higher-leveltheorizing: What kind
of price plans would rms o¤er if not conned to two-part tari¤s - in partic-
ular, can we explain real-life examples of complex non-linear pricing? How
would rms set prices if they did not know the consumers ability to predict
future changes in his preferences? What is the e¤ect of market competition
on consumer welfare?1
The point is that some of the market exploitation anecdotes presented
by Akerlof and Shiller cry out for a connecting thread (one that I have not
mentioned, for the sake of brevity, is the add-on pricing example of Gabaix
and Laibson (2006)). Such a connection requires some theorizing, however
elementary. In the absence of theorizing, all we have is a loose collection
of anecdotes. By refusing to theorize, Akerlof and Shiller water down their
message.
Qualifying the main message
Another important role of theoretical reasoning - especially in the formal-
modeling tradition - is to qualify sweeping verbal statements. Because the
main thesis of Phishing for Phoolsis presented without any trace of formal
modeling, it leaves the impression that phoolishness always harms con-
sumers. But what if it could actually mitigate market failures that originate
from other sources?
Ironically, Akerlofs celebrated market for lemons model provides a
good illustration of this idea, since market failure in the lemons model is
a consequence of uninformed buyerssophisticated understanding of adverse
1For a few papers that address these questions and others, see Eliaz and Spiegler (2006),
Grubb (2009), and K½oszegi and Heidhues (2010). For more general treatments of this class
of models, see Spiegler (2011), K½oszegi (2014) and Grubb (2015).
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selection. As Akerlof and Shiller point out, phoolishbuyers have a lim-
ited understanding of the incentives behind sellersbehavior, and as a result
they may form a biased estimate of the quality of the products that are
traded in the market (see, for example, their discussion of mortgage-backed
securities in Chapter 2). A number of authors (Eyster and Rabin (2005),
Jehiel and Koessler (2008), Esponda (2008)) have proposed ways to model
markets for lemonswith such buyers. These models paint a rich picture:
phoolishnesscan mitigate or exacerbate the market failure due to adverse
selection, depending on the nature of consumerslimited understanding and
the gains from trade. Although I believe that the argument can be (at least
partly) conveyed verbally to a lay audience, in the present context it would
be worthwhile to do it formally.
The above-cited papers all build on a familiar reformulation of the lemons
model, following Bazerman and Samuelson (1985), where a situation in which
many sellers compete for a buyer is approximated by a bilateral-trade game
in which the buyer has all the bargaining power. Formally, an uninformed
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er p to a seller who privately learns the
value v of the object he owns, where v  U [0; 1]. The buyers valuation is
v + b, where the constant b 2 (0; 1) represents the gain from trade. When
the buyer has rational expectations, he knows that the seller will trade if and
only if p > v. Therefore, the buyer chooses p to maximize
Pr(v < p)  [E(v j v < p) + b  p] = p  [1
2
p+ b  p]:
The solution is p = b. Thus, although trade is e¢ cient for all v, in equilib-
rium it will take only place with probability b.
Eyster and Rabin (2005) used the notion of cursednessto model a possi-
ble departure from rational expectations. They assumed that in equilibrium,
the buyer knows the marginal distributions over v and the sellers action,
but does not perceive any correlation between them. Thus, the buyer has
a coarse perception of the sellers behavior, since he fails to account for its
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responsiveness to v. As a result, the buyer chooses p to maximize
Pr(v < p)  [E(v) + b  p] = p  [1
2
+ b  p]:
Thus, the buyers expectations completely disregard the adverse selection
consideration; his forecast of the objects value conditional on trade is given
by the ex-ante distribution. The solution is pER = 1
2
b + 1
4
. We can see that
pER < p if and only if b > 1
2
- i.e., cursedness exacerbates the market
failure due to adverse selection only if the gain from trade is large. The intu-
ition behind this ambiguous e¤ect is that cursednesshas two contradictory
e¤ects. On one hand, the buyers expected valuation is higher than in the
benchmark case because he ignores adverse selection; this raises the buyers
bid relative to the benchmark. On the other hand, the buyer does not realize
that a higher bid would enhance the expected quality of the traded object;
this lowers the buyers bid relative to the benchmark. When the gains from
trade are small, the former consideration outweighs the latter.
This ambiguity also implies that comparative statics with respect to the
buyers degree of phoolishness are not monotone. Jehiel and Koessler
(2008) examined an example in which the buyer has a partially coarse per-
ception of the sellers behavior: he partitions the set of possible realizations
of v into intervals (of potentially unequal size), and he believes that the
sellers strategy is measurable with respect to this partition. Using the no-
tion of Analogy-Based Expectations Equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)), Jehiel
and Koessler show that the equilibrium probability of trade is not monotone
with respect to the neness of this partition. In other words, greater phool-
ishnessdoes not imply a stronger market failure.
Esponda (2008) assumed that the buyers expectation of v conditional on
trade is based on naive extrapolation from the equilibrium distribution itself.
In his model, the buyer learns the traded objects value from observations of
past transactions - without realizing that this sample is adversely selective,
such that if the price that characterized historical observations changed, so
would the observed quality distribution. The equilibrium price pE is dened
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as follows:
pE 2 arg max
p
Pr(v < p)  [E(v j v < pE) + b  p]
= arg max
p
p  [1
2
pE + b  p]
such that pE = 2
3
b. In this case the buyers phoolishnessunambiguously
exacerbates the market failure due to adverse selection. The reason is that
of the two forces identied in our discussion of cursedbuyers, Espondas
model shares only the force that pushes the price down.
The three models described above present di¤erent ways in which the
buyers understanding deviates from the rational-expectations ideal, and they
force us to ask: When we say that buyers dont understand the sellers
incentives, what is it exactly that they dont understand?Alternatively, they
suggest that the bilateral-game reformulation of the lemons market model,
which is successful in the rational-buyer case, might miss a key aspect of
competition among rational sellers for a phoolishbuyer. These question
marks are a valuable corrective to a sweeping message like phoolishness
leads to bad market outcomes.
What is phishing equilibrium?
Toward the end of their book, Akerlof and Shiller give an argument that may
be viewed as an explanation for their atheoretical approach:
This general way of thinking, with its insistence of general equi-
librium, has been the central nervous system for economic think-
ing for almost two and a half centuries. Yet Behavioral Eco-
nomics...seems oddly divorced from it. Our two examples from
Behavioral Economics, of DellaVigna-Malmendier and Gabaix-
Laibson, illustrate. In the style required now for a journal arti-
cle, their modeling and examples are very special...In accord with
the standards of economics journal articles, these articles prove
that phishing for phools exists. They do so by giving models and
examples, where that phishing is undeniable; but the journals
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demand for such undeniability comes at a cost. It means that the
generality of phishing for phools cannot be conveyed. (Akerlof
and Shiller (2015), pp. 169-170)
As this passage demonstrates, when Akerlof and Shiller abandon the anec-
dotal style, it is to advocate a think big, general-equilibrium approach to
the subject of markets with phoolishconsumers - compared with the piece-
meal approach of analyzing small models that characterizes most of academic
economic theory. (As an aside, I would have thought that Akerlofs lemons
model proved once and for all the power of small models to convey big ideas.)
They introduce the notion of phishing equilibriumand dene it essentially
as follows: Every opportunity to exploit consumers is realized.
Yet the meaning of this equilibrium concept is vague. An important fea-
ture of general equilibrium as we know it is linear-price taking. But as we saw
in our discussion of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), endogenously com-
plex price schemes are a hallmark of markets with non-rational consumers.
Therefore, linear-price taking seem inappropriate. Another feature of general
equilibrium is the no-arbitrage principle. Akerlof and Shiller rightly observe
that rms seek every opportunity to exploit phools. However, the no-
arbitrage condition means that such activities should occur o¤ equilibrium;
in equilibrium, the prots from these opportunities have been competed away.
Yet, game-theoretic models of competition for boundedly rational consumers
often have the property that tougher competition does not dissipate prots
because it strengthens rms incentive to obfuscate and target erring con-
sumers (Spiegler (2006), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), Gabaix et al. (2016)).
A general equilibriummodel based on the assumption that competitive
forces drive the gain from the marginal phishdown to zero would exclude
many interesting and potentially relevant situations.
Thus, while the call for a general equilibriumapproach to the subject of
market exploitation of phoolsis genuinely intriguing, it warrants a serious
pure theoryapproach. In the absence of any attempt at formal modeling,
it is hard to understand what phishing equilibriumcould possibly mean or
imply.
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Summary
I have shown that key aspects of the phishing for phoolsargument could
benet from a modicum of theorizing, even allowing for the broad-audience
factor. A more theoretical style would insightfully link the anecdotes; it
would qualify sweeping claims regarding the market implications of phool-
ishness; and it would impose more discipline on conceptualizations like
phishing equilibrium. Of course, economists of Akerlof and Shillers stature
hardly need a sermon about the virtues of economic theory; as the above-
quoted passage indicates, they made a deliberate choice to adopt an anecdotal
style. Their choice reects a wider sentiment that this style is appropriate
to the subject matter. Yet, as I have demonstrated, this has attened the
message of their book.
It may also have diminished the books long-run impact. A broad au-
dience is also a variegated one: readers of a book like Phishing for Phools
include bright undergraduate students from various disciplines. We want
such students to join our ranks and move the discipline forward. Akerlof and
Shillers celebrity and absorbing anecdotal style will surely attract their at-
tention, but a bit of abstract theorizing could better spark their imagination,
by exposing them to the subjects potential depth and richness.
3 The Cost-Benet Style
Another aspect of the atheoretical style in Behavioral Economics is the ten-
dency to use the most elementary modeling devices in the professions toolkit.
Rather than writing down an elaborate choice model that explicitly captures
a psychological mechanism, economists work out behavioralthemes by tak-
ing a completely standard model in which choice follows a straightforward
cost-benet calculus, and then reinterpreting or relabel some of the terms as
biases or errors (e.g., Bar-Gill (2012), Mullainathan et al. (2012)). In this
manner, the modeler seems to have it both ways: on one hand, he can ad-
dress behavioralphenomena and study their implications, yet on the other
hand, he can conduct business as usual in terms of the modeling procedure.
A recent example of this practice is John Campbells Ely Lecture (Camp-
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bell (2016)), which was devoted to boundedly rational decision making in
the context of nancial products, with possible implications for market reg-
ulation. In the lectures theoretical part, Campbell focuses on a particular
regulatory intervention: imposing a tax on complex and potentially exploita-
tive products. To evaluate this intervention, he constructs a simple model
with two products: one simple and the other complex. The simple
product has a xed value, normalized to 0, which is correctly perceived by
all consumers. In contrast, the complex product is characterized by hetero-
geneity in consumersvaluation. First, the products subjective valuation,
denoted u, varies across consumers. Second, subjective valuations may be
biased. Specically, a proportion  of consumers are sophisticated and a
fraction 1    are naive. Sophisticatessubjective valuations are unbiased.
In contrast, when a naive consumer values the complex product at u, its
true value for this particular consumer is u   1. Thus, the valuation error
committed by naive consumers is xed at 1.
Campbell examines the consequences of imposing a xed tax b < 1 on
the complex product under various scenarios for the redistribution of tax
revenues. For simplicity, I consider the case in which the revenues are not
rebated. Consumers with u  b (u  0) choose the complex (simple) product
both before and after the intervention. The only consumers whose behavior
is a¤ected by the intervention are those with u 2 (0; b). Turning to wel-
fare analysis, all consumers with u > b are harmed by the tax, whereas all
consumers with u < 0 are una¤ected by it. In the case of consumers with
u 2 (0; b), we need to distinguish between sophisticates and naifs. The former
are made unambiguously worse o¤ since they switch to the simple product
and earn a net payo¤ of 0, as compared to u > 0 prior to the intervention.
In contrast, naive consumers with u 2 (0; b) are made better o¤ since their
true utility prior to the intervention is u  1 < u  b < 0, as compared to 0
afterward. If there are su¢ ciently many consumers in the latter group, the
tax improves overall consumer welfare.
From a descriptive point of view, Campbells model is a completely stan-
dard utility-maximization model. The behavioralelement is restricted to
the welfare analysis. And while complexity of nancial products is a key
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theme in Campbells lecture, nothing in his model identies the complex
product as such. Consequently, it cannot tell us a story about the origin
of naive consumerserrors. Campbell acknowledges that his simple model
neglects various features, such as interaction between behavioral e¤ects
and other market failures or rmspolitical lobbying. However, some fea-
tures surely count as more intrinsic than others: a model of complex prod-
ucts that does not dene product complexity explicitly is the analogue of a
consumption-saving model that only has one time period.
Now, the Ely Lecture is a publiclecture that addresses a broad audience
of academic economists. Although these are far more technically qualied
than the lay readers of a popular book like Phishing for Phools, it could be
argued that an elaborate behavioral model that explicitly describes product
complexity would be too much for this forum. Perhaps a simplistic cost-
benet analysis is the best we could hope for, given the occasion. In this
section I attempt to counter this claim, by presenting a simple model in
the spirit of Spiegler (2006), which mimics Campbells cost-benet model as
closely as possible while being explicit about product complexity and how it
generates consumer errors. Although the model lends itself to complications
that might be interesting for specialized theorists, its basic version amounts
to maximization of a simple quadratic function, something that Campbells
audience should be able to digest.
The model not only denes product complexity; it also tells a story of how
it comes about. In reality, the nancial products that Campbell discusses are
o¤ered in market settings. Therefore, the most natural way to account for
the origins of product complexity is to assume that it is a result of phishing
(to use Akerlof and Shillers terminology) by prot-maximizing rms. For
simplicity, assume that the complex product is o¤ered by a monopolistic
rm. Think of the product as a state-contingent service contract. The state
of nature is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. The service is o¤ered with
two possible quality levels, 0 or 1. When the rm o¤ers quality q 2 f0; 1g
in some state, it incurs a cost of cq and the consumer earns a payo¤ of
q   b, where c 2 (0; 1) is the cost of o¤ering a high level of quality, and
b 2 [0; 1   c). The rms strategy has two components: a price T , and a
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function f : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g which determines the quality of service in every
state. The complexity of the rms product thus has a concrete meaning
in this model: the product is a state-contingent contract with a rich state
space. Let p =
Z
sf(s)ds be the frequency of the states in which it o¤ers
high quality.
A fraction 1    of consumers are naive and nd it di¢ cult to evaluate
the contract. Every naive consumer follows a simplifying heuristic: he draws
a state s at random, learns the value of f(s), and regards it as a prediction
of the level of quality he will receive if he chooses the rms product. There
is no correlation between the state the consumer draws in the course of this
evaluation procedure and the state that will actually be realized. The inter-
pretation is that the consumer, unable to fully digest the contract with its
many clauses, examines a random clause and treats it as being representa-
tive. His error lies in the fact that he exaggerates the informativeness of a
very small sample - a stylized version of the phenomenon that Tversky and
Kahneman (1971) called the law of small numbers.
The remaining fraction  of the consumer population are sophisticated,
in the sense that their belief regarding the level of quality they will receive is
correct given their information. To mimic Campbells assumption that the
distribution over subjective valuations is the same for both the naive and
sophisticated consumers, I assume that the latter are perfectly informed of
the state of nature, and therefore know the level of quality they will receive
if they choose the complex product. Thus, they also have an informational
advantage over the naive consumers. Note that by paying attention to the
procedural origins of the naive consumerserror, we get a better understand-
ing of what might lie behind Campbells stark assumption. Finally, the terms
of the simple product are exogenous; i.e. quality 0 is o¤ered in all states free
of charge, and therefore, both of consumer types value it at zero. The sim-
plicity of the simple product stems from the lack of quality variation across
states.
A consumers gross valuation of the complex product takes two possible
values, 0 or 1. It follows that the rm will necessarily choose the price T =
1 b, such that a consumers net subjective valuation of the complex product
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is either 0 (in which case he breaks the tie in favor of the complex product) or
 1 (in which case he chooses the simple product). As in Campbells model,
the sophisticated consumer is always right. Unlike Campbells model, the
naive consumers valuation is unbiased on average since it is generated by
an unbiased signal. However, because the consumer will only choose the
complex product when he has a high assessment of its quality, his valuation
of the complex product is biased upward conditional on choosing it. The size
of the bias is 1   p, since the products true expected quality is p whereas
the conditional perceived quality is 1.
The rms problem is reduced to choosing p 2 [0; 1] in order to maximize
p(1  b  c) + (1  )p(1  b  pc)
The rst (second) term of this simple objective function represents the rms
prot from a sophisticated (naive) consumer. Every consumer chooses the
rm with probability p. The rms net prot conditional on being chosen by
a sophisticated consumer is 1   b   c since he chooses the complex product
knowing that it will provide a high level of quality. (Our assumption that
b < 1   c implies that the rm does not incur a loss on sophisticated con-
sumers.) The rms net expected prot conditional on being chosen by a
naive consumer is 1  b  pc since the actual level of quality he will obtain is
independent of the level of quality in the state he sampled.
As long as  is not too large, the solution p to the rms maximization
problem is interior:
p =
1  b  c
2c(1  )
By the assumption that b < 1 c, p > 1
2
. This property will be instrumental
in the welfare analysis presented below. Note that p decreases with b, i.e.,
the rm responds to the tax with a lower frequency of o¤ering a high level of
quality. Intuitively, transactions with naive consumers have an exploitative
bait and switchavor: with probability p(1  p), the rm attracts a con-
sumer who sampled a high level of quality and ends up providing him with
a low level, thus saving the cost. As b rises, the rms prot margin shrinks,
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and its incentive to adopt the cost-saving bait-and-switch tactic becomes
stronger.
Now turn to a calculation of consumer welfare as a function of b. So-
phisticated consumers earn a true payo¤ of zero both before and after the
intervention. Therefore, consumer welfare is driven by the naifs. A frac-
tion p of them choose the complex product and earn a true expected payo¤
of p   (1   b)   b = p   1, whereas their subjective payo¤ is 0. Thus,
the valuation error of naive consumers who choose the complex product is
1  p. Unlike Campbells model, the magnitude of a naive consumers error
increases with b due to the rms endogenous response to the tax. When b
increases, fewer naive consumers end up being exploited, but those who are
get exploited to a greater degree. The latter e¤ect is a regulatory cost that is
missing from Campbells model. Total consumer welfare is (1 )p(1 p),
and because p is greater than 1
2
and decreasing in b, consumer welfare un-
ambiguously decreases with b. That is, the interventions adverse e¤ect due
to greater exploitation of naive consumers who demand the complex product
outweighs the positive e¤ect of reducing their numbers. This equilibrium
e¤ect thus turns out to be crucial, but it is missed by the cost-benet model.
The economic lesson is that using taxes or subsidies to make a complex
product objectively less attractive may impel rms to magnify its role as a ve-
hicle for exploiting naive consumers. Although the example was cookedto
mimic as many features of Campbells model as possible, the aspect it high-
lights would appear in competitive variations of the market model (which
would be technically more intricate), as well as under di¤erent conceptu-
alizations of product complexity. In general, when we analyze the e¤ect
of regulating complexproducts, it helps to have some model of what this
complexity consists of and how consumers deal with it, since this may provide
a clue as to the endogenous market response to the regulatory intervention.2
But is this merely the umpteenth demonstration that equilibrium e¤ects
matter? And if so, couldnt we make the same point within the connes of
the cost-benet style? A practitioner of that style could complicate Camp-
2In Spiegler (2015), I apply this methodology to regulatory interventions known as
nudges(default architecture, disclosure).
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bells basic model by assuming that the product is o¤ered by a rm that
engages in obfuscation. He might represent obfuscation by some real-variable
x and assume that the magnitude of naifserrors is some increasing function
of x. To get an interior solution, he would probably need to assume that
higher values of x are more costly for the rm. The conclusion from such an
extended cost-benet model is likely to be that increasing the tax b leads to
lower investment in obfuscation (because it shrinks the prot margins from
this activity), and therefore smaller errors by naifs - the exact opposite of
the conclusion we obtained from our procedural model.
Thus, the example is about more than the importance of analyzing equi-
librium reaction to regulatory interventions - it also shows that going beyond
the cost-benet style can matter for the analysis. But even if we could some-
how reproduce the concrete economic lesson with some cost-benet-style ex-
tension of Campbells original model, this type of endogenizationcan give
us little insight into the nature of the problem, because the added functions
are black boxes that tell us nothing about what product complexity is and
therefore give us no guide for what assumptions to make.
A model that purports to address a behavioralphenomenon (such as
consumer errors in the presence of product complexity) should contain an
explicit account of this phenomenon. This in turn requires a style of theo-
rizing that is conceptually more sophisticated than cost-benet calculus. At
the same time, in its simplest form, this style can be adapted to the broad
audience of an Ely Lecture. The promise of psychology and economicslies
precisely in the ability to enrich economic analysis in such directions, rather
than in giving us permission to use the same old models while relabeling some
of their components. The fact that this style of theorizing can also a¤ect the
substantive economic lessons means that there is more at stake here than one
theorists aesthetic sensibilities.
4 The Functional-Form Style
In this section I turn from formats like popular books or public lectures, which
are non-technical by design, to the more narrowly targeted and technical
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format of the regular journal article. In this context, the atheoretical style
often nds expression in the use of specic functional forms as a vehicle for
conveying behavioralideas.
We can broadly distinguish between two styles of introducing a novel psy-
chological element into an economic model. First, the modeler can take a
standard functional form that represents preferences or beliefs, and modify
it so that the new behavioral element is directly seen from the modication.
Second, he can target the conceptual framework to which the functional form
belongs, and modify some of its fundamental assumptions or introducing
new primitives. I use the terms functional-form style and conceptual-
framework style to describe these approaches; the latter style is more ab-
stract and theoreticalthan the former. Needless to say, the two styles are
not mutually exclusive, and they can coexist in a given paper. The extent
to which a theorist presents a new behavioral idea via modied functional
forms or modied conceptual frameworks is a marker of the papers style,
and as such it inuences the papers audience and its expectations from the
paper. In this section I discuss a few limitations of the functional-form style
and argue that by its very nature, the topic of psychology and economics
requires a stylistic mix that puts more weight on the conceptual framework
style.
The case of optimal expectations
The limitations of an unadulterated functional-form style were on my mind in
Spiegler (2008), where I examined the model of optimal expectationsdue
to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP henceforth). The BP model is based
on the idea that decision makers deliberately distort their beliefs in order to
enjoy anticipatory utility (in addition to standard material utility). The
distortion is not arbitrary and is subjected to a no cognitive dissonance
constraint, according to which the decision makers action maximizes his
expected material utility given his chosen belief.
BP dene their model in the context of an intertemporal consumption
problem, since they are interested in macro/nance applications. The deci-
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sion makers objective function is
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where ct is consumption in period t; u is the material utility from periodic
consumption; st is the realization of an exogenous state variable in period t;
 is the objective distribution over (s1; :::; sT ); and ^ is the decision makers
chosen belief over (s1; :::; sT ). In one of BPs applications, an investor chooses
between two nancial assets, one safe and the other risky; BP characterize
the investors behavior in this class of binary choice problems.
BP present their model in the functional-form style. They put the func-
tional form front and center and get very quickly to macro/nance applica-
tions, without pausing to study the models more foundational properties.
I found (and still do) the BP model very interesting, but I felt that the
style with which BP chose to present their model left a gap. A model in
which decision makers choose what to believe is a major departure from the
basic principles of rationality. Therefore, despite the models seemingly con-
ventional formulation as a maximization problem, it deserves some deeper
digging.
The relative complexity of the above functional form makes it hard (at
least for me) to gauge the models departure from rational choice. In Spiegler
(2008), I tried to get a better understanding of the BP model using a much
simplied single-period version, where the decision maker chooses an action
a 2 A and a belief ^ 2 (S) (where S is a nite set of states of nature) in
order to maximize the objective function Eu(a)+(1 )E^u(a) subject to
the constraint that a 2 arg maxa0 E^u(a0), where  2 (0; 1) is constant and
 2 (S) is assumed to have full support. I posed the following question:
Can the observed choice correspondence induced by this simplied BP model
be rationalized? In particular, does it satisfy the Independent-of-Irrelevant-
Alternatives (IIA) axiom?
The answer turns out to be negative. When we take a choice set like the
one that BP examined, we can generate examples that exhibit the following
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pattern: the decision maker selects the risky option (and optimistically dis-
torted beliefs) in the binary-choice case, but when a third, very negatively
skewed prospect is added to the choice set, he will revert to the safe op-
tion (and realistic expectations), thus violating IIA. Intuitively, the decision
maker must choose a very optimistic belief if he wants to enjoy an antici-
patory utility from the moderately risky action. However, in the expanded
choice set, the no-cognitive-dissonance constraint requires him to react to
this belief by choosing the third action, which generates lower overall utility
due to its extreme downside.
This nding has several implications. In terms of economic substance, it
shows that the BP predictions regarding the shift in investorschoices due
to optimal expectations are not robust, since they can be overturned if we
expand the choice set. At the psychological and choice-theoretic level, the
violation of the IIA axiom is not arbitrary, but appears to capture an inter-
esting and possibly general insight: people with access to more negatively
skewed options are less likely to delude themselves.
At the methodological level, this exercise demonstrates the role of the
conceptual-framework style in the development of decision models that ex-
hibit behavioralthemes. By taking the simplest possible version of the BP
model and thinking about its basic choice-theoretic aspects, we obtained an
interesting nding that is crucial for the interpretation of BPs results. This
little exercise in choice-theoretic abstraction cannot be outsourcedto pure-
theory specialists - just as we do not expect an applied theorist who solves
an optimization model with rst-order conditions to outsourceto special-
ists the task of checking second-order conditions. This exercise is essential
to a modelers basic understanding of his own model. And yet, it is fair to
guess that because of the applied theorystyle in which BP presented their
model - not to mention the fact that the authors are not choice theorists,
but (highly prominent) macro/nance experts - the papers audience did not
demand a basic choice-theoretic exercise as part of the package. That is, the
style in which a behavioralidea is presented to an audience of professional
academic economists inuences their expectations as to how the idea should
be developed. In this case, it led to an omission of what is in my opinion a
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necessary ingredient.
Parametric modication of functional forms
A major strand in the functional-form style involves the distortion of fa-
miliar formulas with additional parameters. According to this approach, a
researcher who wishes to explore the theoretical implications of a behavioral
element takes a standard economic model, and replaces a conventional for-
mula that represents preferences or beliefs with its parameterized distorted
version. The conventionally rational case is then reduced to setting the added
parameter to a particular value (zero or one, depending on whether the para-
metric distortion is additive or multiplicative).
Rabin (2013) presents an eloquent guide to this parametric modica-
tionapproach. The virtues of this approach that he emphasizes - enabling
empirical tests of a null hypothesis that excludes the behavioral e¤ect in
question, and quantifying the departure from the null hypothesis when it is
rejected - are empirical in nature. And yet it is clear that Rabin intends
this approach to be valid not only for empirical studies, but also for applied-
theory investigations.
In some cases, the limitations of the parametric approach are self-evident.
Suppose that we want to model the phenomenon of unawareness. Total un-
awareness of an event is conventionally captured by a subjective probabilis-
tic belief that assigns zero probability to the event. However, how does one
model partial unawareness? This is a di¢ cult problem that requires us to
probe deeper into what it means to be partially aware of something. What
should be clear is that representing partial unawareness by a probabilistic
belief that mixes the complete-awareness and complete-unawareness subjec-
tive distributions is a non-starter. Whatever such a representation captures,
it is not partial unawareness.
In other cases, the point is more subtle. The example that Rabin (2013)
adduces as the biggest success of the parametric approach is the (; ) repre-
sentation of intertemporal preferences that exhibit a present bias. However,
as Rabin himself points out, the (; ) model cannot be unambiguously im-
plemented with standard optimization, because of the dynamic inconsistency
that it implies (by design). Luckily, the theorist can invoke the multi-selves
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approach to analyzing behavior under dynamically inconsistent preferences.
This approach was in place since Strotz (1955) and Peleg and Yaari (1973),
well before the more recent surge in the popularity of the (; ) model. The
fact that researchers were able to place the (; ) parametrization rmly
within the multi-selves framework facilitated coherent analysis of its implica-
tions. In particular, it made it clear that a key issue in the implementation
of the (; ) model is the solution concept one employs to analyze the res-
olution of the conict among selves. Thus, while the (; ) model is indeed
an example of a very successful implementation of the parametric approach,
its power relies on our ability to relate the parametric form to a more ab-
stract modeling framework. Because the framework was already familiar to
economists, we tend to ignore its crucial role as a platform for the parametric
exercise.
ODonoghue and Rabin (2001) enriched the (; ) model with an addi-
tional parameterization of the notion of partial naivete: decision makers
are not oblivious to the future change in taste but underestimate it. The
ODonoghue-Rabin agent believes that in the future he will have (^; ) pref-
erences, where ^ 2 [; 1]. The extreme cases of ^ =  and ^ = 1 capture per-
fectly sophisticated and perfectly naive decision makers, respectively; and a
higher value of ^ captures greater naivete. This parameterization has become
conventional. In particular, it was employed by DellaVigna andMalmendiers
(2004) in their model of two-part tari¤s in the presence of consumers with a
taste for immediate gratication, which I discussed in Section 2.
Viewed from a slightly more abstract perspective, the (; ^; ) model
is a special case of non-common prior beliefs in the extensive-form game
played between the agents multiple selves. A given self has an incorrect
prior belief regarding the future selvesvalue of the present-bias parameter
. In applications with long time horizons (such that there are more than two
selves), adapting the solution concept that we conventionally use under the
multi-selves approach to the case of partial naivete is conceptually non-trivial,
and ODonoghue and Rabin (2001) indeed grapple with this issue. Rabin
(2013) regards it as a by-product of the parametric-modication approach.
To me, these conceptual considerations are not a side issue but the heart of
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the matter.
I would like to examine another abstract feature of the (; ^; ) model:
any ^ 6=  corresponds to a belief that assigns probability one to the wrong
state of the world. Furthermore, the predicted utility function that is induced
by this prior is a convex combination of the utility functions that are induced
by the two extreme values of the present-bias parameter,  and 1. Spiegler
(2011, Ch. 4) shows that these two features imply that optimal contracting
with such an agent (following Eliaz and Spieglers (2006) generalization of
the DellaVigna-Malmendier model) has an extreme property: the optimal
contract is the same for all ^ > . In other words, partially naive agents
are treated as if they were perfectly naive. This result does not survive
alternative parameterizations of partial naivete (e.g., in Eliaz and Spiegler
(2006), partial naifs assign some probability to the true future preferences).
The lesson is that treating parametric forms as if they were paradigmatic
can distort our understanding of the phenomena they are meant to capture.
In this case, slight zooming outled us to regard the (; ^; ) model as an
instance of combining two familiar modeling frameworks: the multi-selves
model and games with non-common priors. This in turn gave us a better
understanding of key assumptions that drive the implications of this model in
a principal-agent setting. Such an interplay between the functional-form and
conceptual-framework styles is essential for the development of behavioral
ideas.
A conjectural variationsparable
In the Introduction, I drew an analogy between Game Theory and Behavioral
Economics, and implied that the theoretical style of the former could serve
as an inspiration for the latter. I would like to close the present discussion
of the functional-form style with a semi-ctional example, which relates to
Behavioral Economics only by way of a parable that makes use of the Game
Theory analogy.
Imagine that we live in a world in which Game Theory has not been in-
vented; moreover, the only familiar models of market structure are standard
monopoly and perfect competition. Now comes along Professor X and pro-
poses a modeling approach to oligopolistic behavior. He considers a market
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for a homogenous product with n rms and constant marginal cost c. The
inverse demand function is P (Q), where Q is the aggregate supplied quan-
tity. Each rm chooses its production quantity q in order to maximize the
following expression:
q  [  P (nq) + (1  )  p   c]
where  2 [0; 1] is an exogenous parameter that is allowed to vary with n,
and p is the market equilibrium price. In equilibrium, the rmsoptimal
quantity q satises
P (nq) = p:
This model employs the parametric approach to capture equilibrium be-
havior in an oligopoly. When  = 1, the rm plays as if it is part of a cartel
that maximizes industry prots and allocates production evenly among its
members. When  = 0, the rm acts as a price taker, and the model collapses
to competitive equilibrium. An interior value of  captures the intermediate
case of oligopoly. Moreover, we can capture the intuition that a market with
more competitors is more competitive, by assuming that  is some decreasing
function of n. When we assume linear demand P (Q) = 1 Q and c 2 (0; 1),
the equilibrium price is
p =
 + c
 + 1
:
This result is intuitively appealing: a higher value of  (which corresponds
to a greater departure from perfect competition) results in a higher equilib-
rium price. Moreover, Professor X can make assumptions about the speed
with which  decreases with n in order to derive quantitative predictions of
equilibrium mark-ups and industry prots.
I said earlier that this example is partly ctional. In fact, it is very
close in spirit to the actual model of conjectural variations, which was a
popular approach to oligopoly before the advent of Game Theory (see Tirole
(1988), p. 244). That model, too, had a free parameter, which captured
the rms belief regarding the reaction of its opponent to changes in its own
behavior. With the benet of hindsight, it is clear that the game-theoretic
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approach to oligopoly has given us a language for studying many aspects
of oligopolistic behavior - tacit collusion, the value of commitment, entry
deterrence, etc. - that go well beyond the scope of the parametric approach
(whether it takes the form of conjectural variations or the present example).
The latter could continue to o¤er useful reduced formmodels for applied
work, but its status as a Theory of Principle has clearly been diminished by
the rise of the game-theoretic approach. By way of analogy, I believe that a
similar diagnosis applies to Behavioral Economics. Psychological phenomena
often possess intrinsic depth that calls for an enrichment of our analytical
vocabulary, in ways that lie beyond the reach of the parametric approach.
Summary
The attractions of the functional-form style, and the parametric modication
approach in particular, are obvious. It o¤ers the prospect of plug and play
applications, including tools for comparative-statics exercises and for treat-
ment of heterogeneity (e.g., discriminating between consumers with di¤erent
parameter values). The problem begins when functional forms are treated
paradigmatically - rather than as interesting special cases of more abstract
modeling frameworks - thus creating a false impression that the behavioral
phenomena in question have been addressed with scope and generality, and
depressing our appetite for a deeper understanding.
5 Conclusion
I hope that this journey has not left the impression that I am some kind
of a pure-theory fanatic. In fact, I am as uncomfortable with superuous
formalism as the next person. The range of desirable styles of theorizing
varies across subjects, and not every subject requires sophisticated theorizing
of the abstract, foundational variety. However, psychology and economics
is surely one that does, since it deals with the very building blocks of economic
models. The fact that Behavioral Economics has sung its music with a low-
volume theory register is one of the reasons for its popularity; and it is
undoubtedly a sound approach in many contexts. Nonetheless, the approach
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has its limitations, as I hope to have demonstrated in this paper.
Many of the examples I looked at involve the implications of Behavioral
Economics for market interactions and their regulation. This reects the
centrality and topicality of this particular question, as well as my own prior
preoccupation with it. But it also highlights a more general point: the
need for a high-volume theory register is especially acute in the analysis
of interactions with or between behavioralagents. The more economists
try to apply behavioral insights to interactive systems, the greater their
attention to theoretical considerations is likely to be.
In another recent Ely Lecture devoted to Behavioral Economics, Raj
Chetty advocates a pragmaticapproach to Behavioral Economics (Chetty
(2015)). The following paragraph from Chettys paper summarizes his ap-
proach well:
The decision about whether to incorporate behavioral features
into a model should be treated like other standard modeling deci-
sions, such as assumptions about time-separable utility or price-
taking behavior by rms. In some applications, a simpler model
may yield su¢ ciently accurate predictions; in others, it may be
useful to incorporate behavioral factors, just like it may be useful
to allow for time non-separable utility functions. This pragmatic,
application-specic approach to Behavioral Economics may ulti-
mately be more productive than attempting to resolve whether
the assumptions of neoclassical or behavioral models are correct
at a general level.(Chetty (2015), p. 3)
In some sense, I share the sentiment expressed in this passage: I am often
impatient with debates about the general validity of behavioral assumptions.
But the thing I nd striking is the analogy between incorporating behav-
ioralelements in economic analysis and the rather minor decision of whether
to assume time-separable utility functions. In his attempt to make Behav-
ioral Economics more palatable to a general audience, Chetty has also made
it seem harmless. We have thus come back full circle: the atheoretical style
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of disseminating Behavioral Economics amounts to an e¤ective denial of its
revolutionary potential.
Behavioral Economics is not harmless. When one reads the works of
Tversky and Kahneman from the 1970s or Thalers early papers on mental
accounting, one encounters insights that undermine conventional economic
modeling. They attack Bayesian probabilistic sophistication as an unrealistic
description of how people reason about uncertainty. And they claim that
preferences are so malleable, context-specic and prone to mental accounting
as to render the notion of stable preferences meaningless. Reading these
impressive works, the message that I perceive is that a powerful reimagining
of economic theory at the foundational level is needed, one that is comparable
to and perhaps exceeds that brought about by Game Theory. Although the
pragmatic approach to Behavioral Economics has its place, complementing
it with a more abstractly theoretical approach is necessary in order to fully
realize its transformative potential. Otherwise, behavioral economists and
their followers might be committing a sort of present bias: achieving larger
impact in the short run, while sacricing its long-run inuence.
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